How the electorate regarded the Conservatives

The Conservatives had been in power since 1951, and many voters blamed them for the economic problems which became apparent in the early 1960s. The Tories did not seem to have the answers to the problems of rising employment, inflation, industrial unrest and the growing disparity in wealth between the regions of Britain. Labour claimed that the Tories had presided over “thirteen wasted years”.

The Conservatives also seemed out of touch with a modern democratic society. Their new leader Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was a Scottish aristocrat – the fourteenth Earl of Home – who had given up his peerage when he became prime minister in October 1963. Already 60 years old when he became prime minister, he appeared no match for the 47 year old Wilson. Tories were implicated in seedy sex scandals too. The electorate was given the impression that the Tories were an old-fashioned, self-indulgent elite.

The Revival of the Liberal Party

The growing unpopularity of the Tories in the early 1960s benefited the Liberal Party as middle-class voters who wanted to register a protest at the Conservative Party were not prepared to vote for Labour. This was shown by the by-election result in middle-class Orpington in 1962, when a Conservative majority of 14,700 was overturned by the victorious Liberal candidate who won with a majority of 7850.

The Liberal revival brought them more publicity, increased funding and some talented new recruits. As a result they were able to contest many more seats in 1964 than they had done in 1959. They gained only three more seats but doubled their vote. This considerably affected the outcome of the election because, by taking votes from the Conservatives, they helped to hand victory to the Labour Party in many seats (for example Dover, Wellingborough and Bolton East) even though the overall Labour vote fell a little.

Wilson’s government with a majority in single figures, was unusually dominated by electoral considerations, a fact which played alike to the Prime Minister’s skills as his inclination. He foresaw 1966 as the moment when he would form his “real” cabinet, once his interim administration had improvised its way to a more convincing electoral victory, through adroit tactics and clever compromises, designed to keep everyone guessing. The end was duly achieved, but at the price of making the means into a way of life, from which it was subsequently difficult to escape.

Peter Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-2000, 1996

He said he was pragmatic, because all government was pragmatic. For example, he thought equality of opportunity mattered more than equality. The difficultly was that everyone was different. The idea of proletariat was nonsense. Marx did not understand people. He was interested in people as individuals rather than in mass. He was interested in the family, because most happiness was family happiness. He added “I don’t like theory. I got an alpha-plus in economic theory, but I never understood it. I think my examiner must have been very kind. Or perhaps he didn’t understand it either.” One of Harold Wilson’s endearing characteristics has always been his gift for self-mockery.

From John Cole, As it Seemed to Me: Political Memoirs, 1995

Labour in Power: 1964-1970: The New Government

Harold Wilson had excited high expectations of change. His was to be a Britain run by energetic meritocrats not aging aristocrats. His Cabinet certainly was noted for its intellect, filled as it was with a large proportion of men and one woman with firstclass degrees from Oxford. Wilson himself was a noted academic high-flyer, having gained some of the highest marks ever awarded in his degree papers. He was an extraordinary mixture of high intelligence and unassuming middle-class tastes. Not for him the fine wines and fine food beloved of Roy Jenkins. It was reputed that another of his close Cabinet colleagues, Richard Crossman, also a notable Oxford intellect, offended Wilson’s wife by refusing the humble Nescafe offered to him at Number 10. Wilson, all agreed, was not only highly intellectual but very nice. He was pleasant to all, showing as much courtesy and good humour to his drivers as he did to the queen, with whom he famously got on. There was something of the Boy Scout about him and he was probably more influenced by his happy time as a scout than socialist theory. He explained his attitude to politics to the BBC political correspondent, John Cole, and socialist theory was pretty low down on the list.

Wilson’s pragmatism could easily develop into a less attractive “opportunism”, for which he was criticised by colleagues and subsequently historians. Part of this arose from the circumstances of his government in 1964 with its wafer-thin majority, a point made by the Cambridge historian Peter Clarke.

Wilson became the master of the short-term fix, out-manoeuvring his Conservative opponents and his would-be rivals in his own Cabinet. He was increasingly given to sensing plots to replace him and surrounded himself with a “kitchen cabinet” in Number 10, which encouraged this trend. One of the most powerful influences was his political adviser, Marcia Williams who exercised an unaccountable hold over him. Within the real Cabinet, Barbara Castle and Dick Crossman, both ex-Bevanites, were friends as well as colleagues. The same could not be said of the other leading ministers, most of whom were from the Gaitskellite wing of the party and could by no stretch of the imagination be classed as friends to the Prime Minister. Wilson’s technique for managing Cabinet meetings was to allow his colleagues to talk themselves into the ground. Possibly his most hostile colleague was the Labour deputy leader, George Brown who was deeply resentful of Wilson. Brown was an extraordinary individual. He had come up through the trade unions and unlike most of the Cabinet had not been to university.

As soon as he came into office, Wilson ruled out devaluation because:

→ He believed it would reduce the savings of thrifty, working-class families – people he admired and whose interests he believed the Labour Party should be defending.

→ He was aware that devaluation had destroyed one Labour government in 1931 and, in 1949, had severely damaged the Attlee government in which he had served.

→ He did not want the voters to associate Labour with what he called “the easy way out” of economic difficulties.

→ He did not want to upset the Americans. They also had a balance of payments deficit and the US Treasury feared that if the British devalued, the currency traders would assume the Americans were about to do the same and start a run on the dollar.

→ He knew that, with a tiny Commons majority, he would have to have another election before long. He told one of his Cabinet colleagues:

“Devaluation would sweep us away. We would have to go to the country defeated. We can’t have it!”

As a result of in-fighting, the Department of Economic Affairs was wound up in 1969. Nevertheless, the National Plan contributed to the Labour Party’s victory in the March 1966 general election because it suggested that the government had a coherent vision for the future. They campaigned on the slogan, “You know Labour government works”. The Chancellor’s deflationary measures had reduced the balance of payments deficit and prevented a run on the pound, but critics were already pointing out that the government was struggling to impose wage restraints and that the DEA and the Treasury were pursuing contradictory policies.

Devaluation, 1967

The general election of 1966 gave Labour a substantial majority. But, in November 1967, the government had to accept the humiliation of devaluing the pound because there seemed no other way out of its economic difficulties.

• May 1966 seamen went on strike demanding a pay increase that exceeded government pay guidelines.

• The strike damaged British exports and poor trade figures threatened another run on the pound.

• Although the strike ended in July, the government once again chose deflation rather than devaluation to deal with the balance of payments deficit.

• Unemployment was increasing: 1964: 1.7 million; 1967: 2.5 million. in addition another BOP deficit put the pound under pressure once again by autumn.

How successful was devaluation?

The trade figures were stubbornly slow to improve and the substantial balance of payments deficit remained. Nor did devaluation prevent cuts in spending. Roy Jenkins replaced Callaghan as Chancellor but, despite devaluation, concluded that severe deflationary measures were still needed to cure the balance of payments crisis.

Jenkins’ deflationary policies:

• Reduction in military commitments – January 1968 the government announced that all British forces east of Suez (apart from those in Hong Kong and the Persian Gulf) were to be withdrawn by the end of 1971.

• Welfare state – prescription charges, abolished in 1964, were reintroduced.

• Education spending – the raising of the school leaving age from 15 to 16 was deferred from 1971 to 1973, a change that undermined the educational reform that Labour had believed essential to its plan to modernise Britain.

In the budget of March 1968 Jenkins, determined to overcome the balance of payments deficit, delivered another hefty dose of deflation, increasing taxation by £923 million. During 1969 there were signs of improvement. The balance of payments at last showed a surplus, the value of sterling rose and interest rates were reduced.

The economic record of the Labour government

It is possible to argue that, by its short-term focus on the balance of payments and the value of the pound, the Labour government was no more successful than the Tories had been in tackling the underlying weakness of the British economy. For example, the rate of inflation had not been slowed, and unemployment was higher in 1970 than it had been in 1964.

Arguably, the Labour government’s failing to tackle Britain’s long-term problems prevented it from achieving the ambitious aims it had set itself in 1964 of modernising the country and successfully planning a productive, competitive economy.

The Labour government did however, endeavour to improve Britain’s transport network by building motorways in the north of England. It also encouraged the development of manufacturing sites in south Wales, Scotland, Merseyside and Tyneside. However, sustained improvement in industrial productivity was undermined by the government’s deflationary policies which imposed cut-backs in government investment.

Social Reform

Wilson’s Labour Government 1964-1970: The transformation of society

There had been important social changes in the 1950s, which had resulted in changing attitudes:

→ The increase in prosperity meant people travelled more and reduced the divisions between the social classes.

→ The 1950s had saw improved education, a higher standard of living and less respect for tradition.

→ Youth culture, the emergence of the civil rights movement in the US and more employment opportunities for women brought demands for equality.

Many argue that it was Home Secretary Roy Jenkins ability to build upon these developments, and his encouragement of what he termed “the civilised society”, that made a significant impact on ordinary people in Britain. Under Jenkins and his successor Jim Callaghan, there was a “freeing up” of society as the state eased regulation of whole areas of human behaviour and softened punishment.
Most of the reforms had been under discussion for many years, pushed for by activists who were somewhat ahead of public opinion. However, no government until the mid-1960s had wished to court controversy and possible unpopularity by taking a lead.

In 1965, a Bill that suspended the death penalty for five years was passed and then in 1969, it was completely abolished. Jenkins also created a Criminal Justice Bill in 1967, which ended the birching of young offenders. It also introduced the concept of a suspended sentence and extended early parole for certain prisoners. The purpose of both these changes was to reduce the growing prison population, but the same Bill sought to increase the certainty of convictions by allowing majority verdicts in jury cases. There was much evidence of intimidation of some jurors in trials involving major criminals and the police pressed this change on the Home Secretary as a solution. However, public opinion on the death penalty was mixed. In fact, some opinion polls actually showed that the death penalty in murder cases, was actually very popular.

In July 1967, the Sexual Offences Bill was passed. There had been growing pressure from the great and the good to legalise sexual practices between consenting adults. Many had noted how the law, as it stood, encouraged blackmail and that the spy, John Vassall, would probably not have betrayed his country had it not been possible for the Russians to blackmail him for his sexual tastes, which happened to run counter to those of the majority of his fellow citizens. Across much of the country, by the early 1960s, there was a slow but growing tolerance of homosexuality.
The issue of abortion excited even more controversy and its criminalisation probably caused more misery and suffering than the penalties attached to homosexual practices. The illegality of abortion makes estimates of its use difficult to assess, but 100,000 illegal abortions per year in the UK in the 1950s appears the best estimate. This added up to considerable medical risk as well as social stigma and humiliation for many girls and women. The Bill not only legalised abortion on the grounds of physical harm to the mother, but also allowed her mental health to be taken into account, and it was on these grounds that the majority of abortions were to be undertaken. Another liberalisation sought to cut the number of unwanted pregnancies and the Family Planning Act of 1967 removed the restrictions of medical or marital status on women’s access to local authority birth control services and effectively made contraception available to all. This was, of course, damned by some as encouraging “immorality” among the unmarried. In general many traditionalists were outraged and believed that the changes to the law on homosexuality, contraception and the legalisation of abortion encouraged “promiscuous” sex and created a permissive society. A campaign led by Mary Whitehouse against what she regarded as excessive sex, violence and bad language in BBC programmes gained 400,000 supporters.

It was not until 1969, after Jenkins had left the Home Office, that another of his favoured projects finally entered the statute book. The Divorce Reform Act made divorce much easier. To it supporters, it helped to end years of private suffering and domestic unhappiness; to its critics it encouraged the break-up of the family.

Two other important changes encouraged by Jenkins were the abolition of theatre censorship, carried out for centuries by the Lord Chamberlain’s office, and two Race Relations Acts, in 1965 and 1968, established and then extended the powers of a Race Relations Board, designed to investigate complaints against unfair discrimination. Many new arrivals from the Commonwealth settled into working-class areas. This led to a problem for the Labour Party: immigration was unpopular with Labour voters in inner-city areas. One reason for concerns around immigration was racial prejudice, but there was also fears that competition for jobs would mean lower wages. This was why the government tightened the rules on immigration in 1965 and 1968. The 1965 act made discrimination in public facilities illegal and the 1968 act extended the principle to housing and employment. The acts did attempt to tackle discrimination, but the enforcement methods were weak, making it difficult to secure convictions. Politically, the government lowered the voting age from 21 to 18 in 1969. Women also benefitted from the Equal Pay Act of 1970. This bill stated that men and women were to receive the some pay for the same work.

Trade Unions

Some economists argued that the trade unions contributed to Britain’s economic difficulties:

1. In times of inflation: Unions demanded wage increases for their members and fought government attempts to link pay increases to increased productivity
2. Higher wages meant reduced profits of the employers and limited the potential for investment into new methods and machinery
3. Strikes in the period often disrupted British exports and worsened the balance of payments situation

Wilson had hoped to improve industrial relations and win trade union support for his efforts to modernise Britain, but the economic difficulties of the 1960s opened a rift between the government and the unions. Wilson became convinced that:

→ Strikes for higher pay, many of them unofficial, were disrupting production, forcing up labour costs and contributing to inflation and Britain’s poor export performance.

→ Industrial relations needed to be more strongly regulated if the government’s efforts to control prices and wages were to succeed. However, the unions argued that: – The country’s lack of competitiveness should be blamed on employers and on government investment policies, not employees.

→ The government’s attempts to limit wage increases unfairly penalised low-paid workers.

→ The right of unions to bargain freely with their employers should not be restricted by laws.

It was particularly difficult for the Labour government to reform industrial relations because the trade unions were their traditional allies and provided the Labour Party with most of its money. Their block votes at Labour Party conferences could often prove decisive in determining party policy. However, by 1966 and 1967, the relationship between the leadership of the Labour Party and the unions was beginning to fall apart. The big strikes by the seamen and the dockers caused massive problems for the government. These strikes showed how the old-style union bosses were losing some of their control. A lot of strikes started with “wildcat” strikes by local activists who would not take orders from the top.

Barbara Castle and “In Place of Strife”, 1969

In 1968 Wilson was worried by press criticism of his failure to tame the unions and by the Conservative announcement of their own plan to reform industrial relations. In April he asked Barbara Castle, a Cabinet colleague, to lead the newly established Ministry of Employment and Productivity and reform industrial relations. Castle was a fiery personality from the Bevanite left-wing of the party. She believed strongly in a powerful trade union movement but she was also convinced of the need for it to act responsibly. In January 1969, Castle produced her report, “In Place of Strife”.

In Place of Strife : Key proposals

• Employees would have a legal right to join a trade union.

• The government could order a ballot to be held before a strike if it believed there was a serious threat to the national interest.

• In an unofficial dispute the government could order a return to work for a 28-day “cooling-off” period.

• Disputes between unions could be referred to an industrial commission whose decision would be legally binding.

• There would be financial penalties if the commission was not obeyed.

• Workers who were unfairly dismissed would be entitled to compensation or to get their jobs back

The TUC and left-wing Labour MPs were incensed by “In Place of Strife”. As one trade union leader put it, legal sanctions would “introduce the taint of criminality into industrial relations”. More than 50 Labour MPs rebelled when “In Place of Strife” was debated in the House of Commons.

Resistance within the party, the TUC and even in the Cabinet led by Home Secretary, Jim Callaghan, caused Wilson to back down. A face-saving formula was devised by which the TUC gave a “solemn and binding undertaking” that it would monitor strikes and disputes and offer “considered opinion and advice”. The failure of “In Place of Strife” contributed to the fall of the Labour government in 1970 and convinced many outside the Labour movement that trade unions had too much power, but that their resistance to change was a major obstacle to economic progress.

As traditional industries declined and white collar employment grew, some of the largest and most powerful unions lost members. There was an increase in the membership of unions representing workers in the expanding public sector of government administration, health and teaching, but this was not matched by the private sector where many employers discouraged union membership.

Foreign policy challenges facing Wilson

South Rhodesia

European Economic Community

Vietnam War

Foreign Affairs

Wilson had managed to hold a balance between the left and right wings of his party and supporters in the area of social reform. Foreign and colonial policy issues were an area of increased tension.

By 1964, the wind of change had brought independence to eighteen New Commonwealth states, with many more about to follow. The Wilson government could reasonably hope that the complicated process of Britain’s “retreat from empire” might carry on smoothly. This would mean not only granting independence to the colonial peoples who had not yet achieved it, but also reducing Britain’s military responsibilities, especially “east of Suez”, but political and public opinion still clung to the illusion that Britain had an important world role.

Britain and Southern Rhodesia

Britain and the European Economic Community

Britain and the Vietnam War